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Abstract 
Fake online pharmacies have become increasingly pervasive, constituting over 90% of online 
pharmacy websites. There is a need for fake website detection techniques capable of identifying 
fake online pharmacy websites with a high degree of accuracy. In this study, we compared several 
well-known link-based detection techniques on a large-scale test bed with the hyperlink graph 
encompassing over 80 million links between 15.5 million web pages, including 1.2 million known 
legitimate and fake pharmacy pages. We found that the QoC and QoL class propagation 
algorithms achieved an accuracy of over 90% on our dataset.  The results revealed that 
algorithms that incorporate dual class propagation as well as inlink and outlink information, on 
page-level or site-level graphs, are better suited for detecting fake pharmacy websites. In addition, 
site-level analysis yielded significantly better results than page-level analysis for most algorithms 
evaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
Online pharmacies represent an invaluable source of information and products for consumers and 
individuals seeking health-related information. Accordingly, there has been considerable growth in the 
usage of Internet pharmacies (Easton, 2007; Wilford et al., 2006). Unfortunately, they have been 
accompanied by the proliferation of a large number of fake pharmacy websites (i.e., ones selling fake 
drugs, providing fictitious information, and/or failing to ship the agreed upon goods altogether). 
According to a Food and Drug Administration study, less than 10% of the 12,000 Internet pharmacies 
examined were legitimate (Krebs, 2005). The number of users visiting fake online pharmacies has also 
tripled over the past year (Greenberg, 2008).  
Fake pharmacy websites are likely to offer a distinct set of challenges to standard fake website detection 
methods due to a large number of internal links within a site. Though such internal links are typical within 
an online store (like a pharmacy), they are not common in escrow, bank, and other e-commerce sites 
examined by other spoof site detection studies (Abbasi and Chen, 2007; 2009a; 2009b; Abbasi et al., 
2008; 2010; Liu et al., 2006). This provides the motivation to study the performance of state-of-the-art 
algorithms on pharmacy sites. In addition, since fake pharmacy website developers spend millions of 
dollars on black-hat search engine optimization in order to make their websites more visible (Greenberg, 
2008) we contend that they may be susceptible to detection by link-based techniques designed to combat 
web spam (Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina, 2005). However, it is unclear how effective web spam detection 
methods, which make specific assumptions about the linkage between good and bad pages, would be on 
fake pharmacy websites. 
2. Existing Link-Based Techniques 
Several link-based techniques have been proposed for detecting web spam. Table 1 presents a summary of 
select link-based algorithms used in prior fake website detection research. These techniques can be 
categorized according to their propagation mechanisms, which are based on the assumptions they make 
regarding how real and fake web pages are connected to one another. Single class propagation algorithms 
begin with a seed set of known good or bad pages. These pages’ ‘goodness’ or ’badness’ is then 
propagated through the graph via their inlinks and/or outlinks. Examples of single class propagation 
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algorithms include BadRank, TrustRank, AntiTrustRank, and ParentPenalty (Gyongyi et al., 2004; 
Krishnan and Raj, 2006; Wu and Davison, 2005). Dual class propagation algorithms, such as QoC and 
QoL, utilize good and bad seed pages and also propagate scores through both inlinks and outlinks (Zhang 
et al., 2006). A third class of algorithms like PageRank does not use any seed pages; it is a purely 
unsupervised scoring algorithm that was not designed to detect bad pages (Page et al., 1998). 
Nevertheless, it is effective at detecting fake web pages that do not utilize link farms and is therefore 
often used as a baseline (Zhang et al., 2006). 
However, it is unclear as to how these link-based algorithms designed for web-spam detection (Gyongyi 
and Garcia-Molina, 2005; Gyongyi et al., 2004; Krishnan and Raj, 2006; Wu and Davison, 2005) would 
perform on fake pharmacy websites. In addition, there is a gap in the understanding of the effect of inlinks 
and outlinks and node granularity (webpage vs. website) on these algorithms. In this study, we explore the 
following research questions to address these issues: 
• How effective are existing link-based algorithms for the detection of fake online pharmacy 
websites? 
• What impact does the propagation mechanism, including the number of classes propagated and 
whether the algorithm uses inlinks and/or outlinks, have on performance? 
• Which granularity (page or site) is the most suited in this domain? 
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3. Research Testbed and Design 
We collected 150 legitimate and 150 fraudulent online pharmacy websites. The URLs for these websites 
were obtained from reputable sources including the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy 
(www.nabp.net) and LegitScript (www.legitscript.com). All pages within each website were collected 
leading to an initial collection of approximately 1.2 million pages. Surprisingly, the fake pharmacy 
websites were much larger than the legitimate ones, with nearly twice as many pages. The entire 
hyperlink graph for these 300 seed URLs was collected over a 3-month period using link expansion. This 
involved iteratively collecting all inlinks and outlinks of queue pages, adding the newly collected pages to 
the queue, and repeating the process (where the initial queue contained all pages from the 300 seed 
websites). The graph encompassed over 15.5 million pages from approximately 930,000 
websites/domains, with 81 million unique links. 
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We evaluated seven common algorithms for fake-website detection using our dataset -  BadRank, 
TrustRank, PageRank, AntiTrustRank, ParentPenalty, QoL, and QoC. A bootstrapping approach was 
employed where the 300 websites were randomly split into 150 training and 150 test cases for 30 
independent runs. For any particular run, the algorithms were only evaluated on the pages associated with 
the 150 test websites. Each algorithm’s parameters were tuned extensively; the settings yielding the best 
results on the testing data were utilized. Consistent with prior research (Wu and Davison, 2005), the 
evaluation metrics employed included overall accuracy and class-level precision, recall, and F-measure. 
In order to answer the third research question, we conducted two independent experiments using the 
above methodology – one with page level and the other with site level data. 
4. Experimental Results 
In the first experiment, the algorithms were run on the page-level graph. The results, averaged across the 
30 bootstrap runs, are presented in Table 2. Both, page-level and site-level results were computed. The 
site-level results were aggregated, where a website was considered legitimate only if the majority of its 
pages were deemed legitimate by the algorithm. QoC had the best overall performance, followed by QoL. 
Single class propagation algorithms such as BadRank, AntiTrustRank, and ParentPenalty had higher 
performance on legitimate websites but were highly ineffective on fraudulent ones (with low fake website 
recall). Their inability to effectively propagate badness scores to fake pages resulted in many false 
positives (i.e., fraudulent pages classified as being legitimate). Similarly, TrustRank performed poorly on 
legitimate websites since it it could not effectively propagate goodness scores to many of the legitimate 
websites. However, it performed well on the fraudulent websites, resulting in high overall page-level 
accuracy (since the fraudulent websites comprised a much larger share of the web pages in the test bed). 
          
Table 2: Site-Level Classification Performance using Page-level Graph 
Site Level Performance 
Algorithm Overall 
Accuracy 
Legitimate Websites Fake Websites 
F-Meas. Precision Recall F-Meas. Precision Recall 
BadRank 52.29 67.67 51.18 99.87 8.92 96.56 4.71 
TrustRank 59.62 38.86 79.59 25.78 69.84 55.76 93.47 
PageRank 60.29 67.09 57.32 80.93 49.85 67.47 39.64 
AntiTrustRank 57.36 69.00 54.22 94.93 31.50 80.22 19.78 
ParentPenalty 51.07 67.15 50.54 100.00 4.61 100.00 2.13 
QoL 74.51 66.25 97.70 50.22 79.51 66.54 98.80 
QoC 88.09 86.93 96.14 79.42 89.05 82.54 96.76 
 
Page Level Performance 
Algorithm Overall 
Accuracy 
Legitimate Websites Fake Websites 
F-Meas. Precision Recall F-Meas. Precision Recall 
BadRank 27.90 41.78 27.04 99.98 3.61 99.32 1.90 
TrustRank 83.21 54.46 88.95 40.28 89.32 82.00 98.46 
PageRank 41.13 35.85 26.62 63.13 44.98 71.68 34.21 
AntiTrustRank 31.65 37.08 24.90 78.97 22.56 64.13 14.61 
ParentPenalty 33.13 43.36 28.27 99.58 15.23 89.24 8.69 
QoL 84.73 60.23 94.39 45.19 90.22 83.10 99.12 
QoC 94.11 87.54 94.79 81.61 95.94 93.60 98.47 
 
Figure 1 shows the accuracies on the pages ranked in the top 100,000 (good and bad) for each algorithm, 
based on the algorithm’s scores. For instance, since BadRank assigns badness scores, the top 100,000 
good pages using BadRank would be the ones with the lowest scores (while the top 100,000 bad pages 
would be ones with the highest scores). The figure reaffirms the findings from Table 2, with the 
performance of QoC and QoL near the top in both good and bad pages, while the other algorithms 
performing well on only one of the classes. Both QoC and QoL are dual class propagation algorithms and 
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they are also the only ones that incorporate inlink and outlink information during the propagation process. 
Pair-wise t-tests conducted on the 30 bootstrap runs revealed that these two techniques significantly 
outperformed the other 5 single class propagation algorithms (all 10 p-values < 0.001, n=30). Moreover, 
QoC also significantly outperformed QoL (p-value < 0.001, n=30). 
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Figure 1: Accuracy on Top 100,000 Ranked (a) Good and (b) Bad Pages 
 
In the second experiment, the seven algorithms were run on the site-level graph. This graph contained a 
single node for each website and only inter-site links, resulting in a smaller graph. The results, averaged 
across the 30 bootstrap runs, are presented in Table 3. Once again, QoC and QoL had the best 
performance, attaining over 90% overall accuracy. In general, the results using site-level graphs were 
better. Five of the seven algorithms attained better results, with improvements ranging from 7% to 21%. 
Pair-wise t-tests conducted on accuracy were significant for these five algorithms (all five p-values 
<0.001, n=30). This suggested that internal links within a site may play an important role in this domain. 
However, PageRank and ParentPenalty’s performance fell, with the decrease significant for PageRank. 
We are in the process of examining the results closely to better understand the performance of these 
algorithms.   
 
Table 3: Classification Performance using Site-level Graph 
Algorithm Overall 
Accuracy 
Legitimate Websites Fake Websites 
F-Meas. Precision Recall F-Meas. Precision Recall 
BadRank 65.22 73.02 59.66 94.13 51.01 86.39 36.31 
TrustRank 81.67 82.11 80.15 84.49 81.12 83.93 78.84 
PageRank 53.89 68.30 52.04 99.33 15.40 92.81 8.44 
AntiTrustRank 70.44 75.93 64.09 93.20 61.66 87.70 47.69 
ParentPenalty 50.67 53.56 48.13 60.44 40.45 46.88 34.89 
QoL 92.84 92.57 95.69 89.82 93.08 90.59 95.87 
QoC 95.71 95.62 97.43 93.96 95.80 94.26 97.47 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Directions 
In this preliminary study, we investigated the effectiveness of several existing link-based algorithms for 
the detection of fake online pharmacy websites. The results revealed that algorithm and graph 
characteristics both play an important role in the accurate detection of fake pharmacy websites. The dual 
propagation algorithms that considered inlink and outlink information for good and bad seed pages 
provided the best performance. Further, site-level graphs yielded considerably better results than page-
level ones for most algorithms evaluated. 
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Based on these findings, we have identified some future research directions. We intend to bolster the 
algorithm comparison analysis by incorporating receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves showing 
the impact of different page and site-level thresholds on true and false positive rates. Given the large 
imbalance between the number of legitimate and fake pharmacy websites in existence, we also intend to 
explore the impact of using different ratios of legitimate and fake sites in the training data. Given the 
strengths and weaknesses of these algorithms, we are also exploring various fusion strategies for 
combining the algorithms in a manner that harnesses their collective discriminatory potential. These 
include using them as features in machine learning classification algorithms (e.g., Decision trees, Logit 
regression) or using the output of certain single class propagation algorithms with high class-level 
precision as input for others. We are also evaluating the efficacy of hybrid classification approaches that 
combine content analysis with link-based algorithms. 
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